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NOTES AND COMMENTS
INVIDIOUS DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE NA-
TIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT: A LITTLE
CHANGE COULD GO A LONG WAY
I. INTRODUCTION
When the Wagner Act' was passed by Congress in 1935 its stated
purpose was the elimination of obstructions to the free flow of commerce
by encouragement of collective bargaining and by protection of employ-
ees' exercise of their right to freedom of association and of self-organiza-
tion in negotiating terms and conditions affecting their employment.
Neither that Act nor subsequent acts amending it2 contain any language
specifically referring to discrimination based on race, religion, national
origin or sex; yet such discrimination by employers or labor organiza-
tions bears so heavily on adequacy of bargaining representation and
employment conditions that the National Labor Relations Board, which
is charged with the responsibility of administering those laws, very early
found itself involved with problems of invidious discrimination.
This involvement grew and took on increasing significance as the
national conscience was prodded awake by such nonlabor cases of racial
discrimination as Brown v. Board of Education,3 and when the pres-
sures for the recognition of civil rights for minorities exploded during
the 1960s the NLRB was predictably one of the agencies of the federal
government which felt the brunt.
Despite the formulation by Congress and the judiciary of alternate
means of redress, 4 there is a continuing need and place in the antidiscrim-
1. Act of July 5, 1935, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449.
2. Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley), ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947);
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (Landrum-Griffin), Pub. L. No. 86-
257, 73 Stat. 519 (1959) (hereinafter referred to collectively as the National Labor Re-
lations Act, the NLRA, or the Act).
3. 348 U.S. 886 (1954).
4. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, 78 Stat. 253, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e-2000e-15 (1970), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1974) [hereinafter referred to in
1
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ination arsenal for the remedies which the NLRB has developed. It is
the purpose of this comment to examine the history and current use of
these remedies, to show their strengths and weaknesses, and to suggest
changes which will bring them closer to achieving the dual goals of
harmony in labor relations and elimination of invidious discrimination
from the employment arena.
The approaches taken by the NLRB to the problems of invidious
discrimination can be grouped in three broad categories2 First, dis-
the text as Title VI]; Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1982 (1970).
5. A potential fourth group, correction of discrimination by means of grievance
and/or arbitration procedures, has been excluded from the text because it seldom in-
volves the NLRB and thus is not a "Board approach."
Although section 9(a) of the Act protects the rights of the individual employee to
engage in adjustment of grievances with his employer in the absence of the collective
bargaining representative, in practice the grievance processing function is usually per-
formed by the union. Courts have given recognition to this practice by ordinarily re-
quiring employees to exhaust the union procedure before bringing suit against the em-
ployer in district court for breach of the employment contract (Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S.
171 (1967); Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965)), but have had more
difficulty dealing with the natural tensions between the rights of employees to act con-
certedly in their own interest and the union's right to be the exclusive bargaining agent
of those employees.
When the complaint concerns invidious discrimination, the fact that such conduct
is illegal under Title VII has led one court to rule that concerted activity outside union
procedures is protected activity notwithstanding that it tends to weaken the principle of
exclusive representation, because the individual and the union are forbidden by law to
be on opposite sides of the issue. Alexander v. Gardener-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36
(1973), cf. NLRB v. Tanner Motor Livery, Ltd., 349 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1965), on re-
mand, 166 N.L.R.B. 551 (1967), vacated and remanded, 419 F.2d 216 (9th Cir. 1969).
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia apparently agreed with this rea-
soning, but would have limited the protection to individual actions undertaken after
union efforts had led them to a good faith belief that it was not proceeding against dis-
crimination to the fullest extent possible. Western Addition Community Organization
v. NLRB, 485 F.2d 917 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The Supreme Court recently reversed the
decision on the ground that the principle of exclusive representation offered adequate
safeguards for protection of minority interests. In the Court's opinion, this considera-
tion rendered unnecessary an undercutting of that principle to accommodate the national
labor policy against discrimination. Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Com-
munity Organization, 420 U.S. 50 (1974). Apparently, the national policy is not as
strong as had been believed. This decision may, because of that implication, dampen
whatever judicial and Board enthusiasm presently exists for dealing with discrimination
under the N.R.L.A. See generally Gould, Racial Protest And Self-Help Under Taft-
Hartley: The Western Addition Case, 29 ARB. J. 161 (1974).
The proficiency of the grievance/arbitration process has not been entirely satis-
factory with regard to protecting individuals form invidious discrimination. Two pos-
sible methods of improving its performance are worth mentioning here. One is the sug-
gestion that concerned third parties be allowed to intervene in either proceeding if de-
sired by the minority complainant. See, e.g., Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964);
Acuff v. United Papermakers & Paperworkers, 404 F.2d 169 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. de-
nied, 394 U.S. 987 (1969); Bloch, Racial Discrimination in Industry and the Grievance
Process, 21 LAB. LJ. 627, 640-42 (1970); Gould, Racial Equality in Jobs and Unions,
2
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crimination on the part of a union acting or seeking to act as a statutory
bargaining representative has been held to be a breach of the union's
duty of fair representation. Where a breach occurs, the Board has
determined that its inherent authority over representation matters under
section 96 of the NLRA warrants imposition of sanctions. Second, an
employer or a labor organization which practices invidious discrimina-
tion may under certain conditions have committed an unfair labor
practice as defined by section 87 of the Act. If so, the Board is
authorized by section 10s to issue remedial orders to nullify the effects
of that practice. Third, as a government instrumentality the NLRB is
forbidden by the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion, as incorporated in the fifth amendment, to aid discrimination by a
private party or organization. This principle has been interpreted to
justify the withholding of Board processes from labor organizations and
possibly employers which discriminate.
II. THE DUTY OF FAiR REPRESENTATION
The development of the fair representation doctrine began in 1944
with the Supreme Court decisions in Steele v. Louisville & Nashville
R.R. and Wallace Corp. v. NLRB. 1° In Steele, the union acting as the
exclusive bargaining representative of the craft of railroad firemen
agreed with the railroad-employer to restrict and ultimately exclude
Negro firemen from the service. Disapproving that conduct, the Court
held that the Railway Labor Act imposes upon the statutory representa-
tive of a craft "the duty to exercise fairly the power conferred upon it in
behalf of all those for whom it acts, without hostile discrimination
against them.""
The duty was, in the Court's opinion, necessary to avoid conflict
Collective Bargaining and the Burger Court, 68 MIcH. L. REv. 237, 245-48 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Racial Equality]; Gould, Labor Arbitration of Grievances Which
Involve Racial Discrimination, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 40, 58-64 (1969). The other is the
proposal to incorporate Title VII standards for proof of discrimination into the grievance
and arbitration mechanisms. This is unlikely to occur spontaneously, since an arbitrator
is chosen by and acts for the union and the employer and thus interprets the private
agreement between them, not the public policies of the nation. See id. at 47-49.
For a discussion of unfair labor practices charges against unions for their handling
of grievances see text accompanying notes 32-77 infra.
6. 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1970).
7. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1970).
8. 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1970).
9. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
10. 323 U.S. 249 (1944).
11. 323 U.S. at 203.
1976]
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with the Constitution,1 2 but it reasoned that in the case of employees
who were denied membership in the union which represented them, it
was the statutory grant to the union of the right to be the exclusive
representative' 3 in collective bargaining over their employment rights
which called forth that duty.' 4 By granting exclusive representation
rights to the union, the statute deprives individual employees of the right
to bargain for themselves and thus, without the union duty to represent
them fairly, they are by act of Congress rendered powerless to protect
themselves-a constitutionally indefensible situation.
The duty of fair representation was originally a judicial doctrine,
enforceable in the federal district courts.15 It was adopted by the
NLRB in 195316 and the Board has generally complied with the court
extensions and refinements of the doctrine since that time.' 7
As to the standard by which union fairness is to be measured, the
courts interpreted the avoidance of "hostile discrimination," which was
required under Steele, to preclude any union liability in the absence of
bad faith.'8  As applied to invidious forms of discrimination, bad faith
encompassed only conduct undertaken with intent to effect such dis-
crimination. The requirement of proof of such intent offered a major
barrier to use of the duty of fair representation theory to prevent any but
the most blatantly discriminatory union conduct.' 9
The Supreme Court, in Vaca v. Sipes,20 appears to have taken a
step in the direction away from emphasis on the requirement of bad
12. Id. at 198.
13. For discussion of the nature and effects of this important concept see Ford
Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953); J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332
(1943); NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175 (1967); Wellington, Union
Democracy and Fair Representation: Federal Responsibility in a Federal System, 67
YALE L.J. 1327, 1333 (1958).
14. The Court did not make clear whether it believed the duty of fair representa-
tion to be rooted in the Constitution or in the labor statute. This controversy remains
unresolved with the present members of the NLRB split 3-2 for the constitutional basis
theory, but disagreeing as what that position requires of the Board. 6ee Bell & Howell
Co., 213 N.L.R.B. No. 79 (1974), Bekins Moving & Storage Co., 211 N.L.R.B. No. 7
(1974).
15. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 207 (1944).
16. Hughes Tool Co., 104 N.L.R.B. 318 (1953).
17. Syres v. Oil Workers Int'l Union, 350 U.S. 892 (1955). See also Generac Corp.
215 N.L.R.B. No. 41 (1974); Miranda Tool Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement
denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
18. See, e.g., Hardeastle v. Western Greyhound Lines, 303 F.2d 182 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 920 (1962); Cunningham v. Erie R.R., 266 F.2d 411, 417 (2d Cir.
1959).
19. See Clark, The Duty of Fair Representation: A Theoretical Structure, 5I Tax.
L. REv. 1119, 1132-33, 1155 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Clark].
20. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
[Vol. 11: 513
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faith. In attempting to define the duty of fair representation the Court
described it as an obligation "to exercise its discretion with complete
good faith and honesty, and to avoid arbitrary conduct."' '  The lan-
guage can be read as applying two separate standards, that of good
faith, and that of freedom from arbitrariness. If this interpretation is
correct,22 the new emphasis on arbitrary conduct could serve as a base
for expanding the duty of fair representation to prohibit union decisions
in which, for example, race, religion, national origin or sex are suspected
factors and the other reasons asserted for the decision are insufficient to
support it. This may not seem to be a significant expansion, but it
would at least have the effect of shifting to the union a portion of the
burden of proof when the reasons for its conduct are not readily
ascertainable. 3
Since the Vaca decision, the bad faith standard appears to be on
the decline in substance if not in form. The trend is toward a more
liberal view of what constitutes bad faith,24 but at least four circuits have
found that it is no longer required to establish a breach of the duty of
fair representation.2"
Julia Penny Clark, in arguing that the proper standard should be
that of reasonableness, has pointed out that, although the Supreme
Court did not explain its use of the word arbitrary in the Vaca and
21. Id. at 177 (emphasis added).
22. See Griffin v. United Auto Workers, 469 F.2d 181 (4th Cir. 1972), interpreting
the Vaca decision as an intentional expansion of the standard; contra, Amalgamated
Ass'n of Steelworkers v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 301 (1971) in which the Court stated
that the duty of fair representation "carries with it the need to adduce substantial evi-
dence of discrimination that is intentional, severe, and unrelated to legitimate union ob-
jectives . ... "
23. In evaluating the significance of any apparent expansion it should be remem-
bered that the Supreme Court has steadily maintained that the duty of fair representation
was not intended to inhibit union discretion in bargaining for or administering contracts.
This does not mean that the statutory representative of a craft is barred
from making contracts which may have unfavorable effects on some of the
members of the craft represented. Variations in the terms of the contract
based on differences relevant to the authorized purposes of the contract...
such as differences in seniority, the type of work performed, the competence
and skill with which it is performed, are within the scope of the bargaining
representation of a craft, all of whose members are not identical in their inter-
ests or merits.
Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 203 (1944). See also Ford Motor
Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953).
24. See, e.g., Peterson v. Rath Packing Co., 461 F.2d 312 (8th Cir. 1972); St. Clair
v. Teamsters Local 515, 422 F.2d 128 (6th Cir. 1969).
25. Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 90 L.R.R.M. 2497, (6th Cir. 1975); Griffin
v. U.A.W., 469 F.2d 181 (4th Cir. 1972); Figueroa v. Sindicato de Trajabadores Pack-
inghouse, 425 F.2d 281 (1st Cir. 1970). Compare Retana v. Apartment Operators Lo-
cal 14, 453 F.2d 1018 (9th Cir. 1972), with International Longshoremen's Union v.
Kuntz, 334 F.2d 165 (9th Cir. 1964).
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Humphrey v. Moore26 opinions, "the contexts indicate that it used
'arbitrary' to describe irrational and unreasoned decisions. '2 7 If ration-
ality should in the future become the accepted standard by which
union conduct is to be measured, 2s it is clear that individuals represent-
ed by unions would have a more realistic weapon with which to protect
themselves not only from the effects of invidious discrimination but
from all forms of unfair or ill-considered conduct by which that union
may infringe their rights.
The duty of fair representation doctrine, under the standards pres-
ently being applied, has been criticized as incapable of providing real
protection for the rights of the individual employee. 2  This may be true
for reasons other than the limits in scope effected by the standards.
First, since the NLRB authority over representation matters comes into
play only when the union attempts to take advantage of the Board's
certification process, the Board cannot under the duty of fair representa-
tion doctrine remedy breaches committed by the multitude of labor
organizations which have established themselves in collective bargaining
relationships without aid of the Act. 0 Second, while the Board may
effectively withhold or revoke union certification under section 9 of the
Act, any affirmative remedy which it might devise would not be enforce-
able against an unwilling union. Finally, under the NLRA the duty of
fair representation proceedings are not available to the injured employ-
ee.31 All these factors have made the duty of fair representation alone
of limited value in discouraging invidious discrimination under the
NLRA.
fII. UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE PROCEEDINGS
A. AGAINST LABOR UNIONS
The aforementioned disadvantages of the duty of fair representation
doctrine have not left the National Labor Relations Board to fade from
the scene of effective antidiscrimination agencies. Congress unknow-
26. 375 U.S. 334 (1964).
27. Clark, supra note 19, at 1131.
28. A recent Board decision appears to support this standard. See General Truck
Drivers Local 315, 217 N.L.R.B. No. 95 (1975).
29. Clark, supra note 19, at 1132-33, 1155.
30. Moreover, it is just such labor organizations which are likely to be most power-
ful and thus have a greater potential of harm from duty of fair representation breaches.
However, such an offense is "reachable" through suit in federal district courts.
31. The district court proceedings, by contrast, can be initiated by the individual,
but at his own expense.
[Vol. 11:513
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ingly provided the key to a better way when it wrote unfair labor
practices into the NLRA with the Taft-Hartley amendment of 1947.32
Under section 10 of the amended Act all three of the weaknesses of
section 9 proceedings were corrected and a bonus was added: the
expense of charging, investigating and prosecuting an unfair labor
practice is borne by the government.33
The NLRB made use of sections 8 and 10 in the case of Miranda
Fuel Co.34 The majority of the Board found that the right to be
represented fairly was a right encompassed by section 735 of the Act. It
reasoned therefore that a breach by the union of its duty of fair
representation violated section 8(b)(1)(A)36 and was an unfair labor
practice which it could remedy by means of section 10 provisions for
prevention of unfair labor practices.37  The majority found further that
an employer who assents to the prohibited union conduct has violated
section 8(a)(1), 35 the employer parallel of section 8(b)(1)(A), and
thus the same remedies are available against him.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied
enforcement of the Board's order in Miranda,39 but only one member of
the three-judge panel explicitly disapproved the rationale used.40 The
NLRB subsequently has adhered to the majority's view in numerous
32. Ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136.
33. However, the charging party does pay the price of loss of control over the case.
The General Counsel of the NLRB, a political appointee, has absolute and unreviewable
discretion as to whether to prosecute a complaint, in what manner, and to what extent.
34. 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
35. Section 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970) provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collec-
tive bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right
to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right
may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization
as a condition of employment as authorized in section 158(a) (3) of this title.
36. Section 8(b)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1970) provides: "It shall be
an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents-(l) to restrain or coerce
(A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title. .. .
37. Section 10(c) authorizes the Board on its finding an unfair labor practice to
"cause to be served.. . an order requiring such person to cease and desist from such
unfair labor practice, and to take such affirmative action. . . as will effectuate the poli-
cies of this subchapter. . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970).
38. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1970).
39. NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co., 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
40. Judge Lumbard did not find the evidence sufficient to support the finding of a
breach of the duty of fair representation. Id. at 180 (Lumbard, J., concurring). This
point prompted the observation by one commentator that it was indeed "puzzling that
a divided Board would choose a vehicle so factually unattractive to deliver a revolution-
ary doctrine." Boyce, Racial Discrimination and the National Labor Relations Act, 65
Nw. U.L. REv. 232, 238 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Boyce].
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cases, though its members have never approved it unanimously. 41
Two years later, the Miranda doctrine was expanded in Independ-
ent Metal Workers Local 1.42 That union maintained racially segregated
locals which had failed to process the grievances of black employees.
The Board found that this practice violated section 8(b)(1)(A) under
Miranda, and also found since the duty of fair representation applied to
collective bargaining by the statutory bargaining agent, and processing
of grievances is a part of the continuing bargaining process, that the
union's breach of its duty of fair representation under such circum-
stances violated its duty to bargain within the meaning of section8(b)(3) .43
That same year the Board decided Local 1376, International Long-
shoremen's Association,44 in which it found that the duty to bargain in
good faith imposed by section 8 (d) of the NLRA imposed the obligation
on union and employer alike not to establish through collective bargain-
ing an agreement which contained invidious discriminatory provisions.
A union which bargained for such an agreement was held to have
breached its duty of fair representation and to have committed a section
8(b)(3) unfair labor practice.
The duty of fair representation/unfair labor practice doctrine was
broadened yet another time in 196441 with Local 12, URW 40 wherein
the Board took the last major step to establish the current scope of that
doctrine. In that case collective bargaining resulted in a contract which
contained no discriminatory provisions on its face. However, the union
passively assented to the employer's interpretation of the contract, allow-
ing discrimination in practice, and refused to process the grievances of
black employees concerning those practices. Upon the basis of Inde-
pendent Metal Workers the union was found to have violated its duty of
fair representation under section 8(b)(3). In addition, the majority of
41. See Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 209 N.L.R.B. 519 (1974) (Fanning, concurring).
For an example of subsequent judicial approval see Truck Drivers Local 568 IV.
NLRB, 379 F.2d 137 (1967), Local 12, URW, 150 N.L.R.B. 312 (1964), enforced, 368
F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967).
42. 147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964).
43. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(3) (1970).
44. 148 N.L.R.B. 897 (1964).
45. It is interesting that 1964, with its three Board extensions of the duty of fair
representation, was also marked by the passage of an important congressional alterna-
tive for attacking invidious discrimination, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No.
88-352, 78 Stat. 241.
46. 150 N.L.R.B. 312 (1964), enforced, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 837 (1967).
[Vol. 11: 513
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the Board found a separate breach of the duty of fair representation in
the union's passivity, stating that "the duty of fair representation may
be breached, not only by action, but by inaction as well."147 The union
was ordered to "[p]romptly propose to the Company specific contrac-
tual provisions prohibiting racial discrimination in terms and conditions
of employment .... "48 Apparently, the duty of fair representation
requires the union to act affirmatively to prevent not only establishment
of a discriminatory contract, but discriminatory administration of a fair
contract as well. 49
Finally, in Local 106, Glass Bottle Blowers Association, ° the
NLRB found that the union's maintenance of sex-segregated locals in the
absence of any contract or employment discrimination was an unfair
labor practice violating section 8(b) (1) (A) on the grounds that (1)
separate but equal was as inherently unfair when based on sex as when
based on race and (2) employees in one local were denied participation
in the resolution of grievances processed by the other local, although
they were bound by those resolutions.
The decision did not rely on Miranda,1 but it has decided signifi-
cance in regard to unfair labor practices. By implication, if the partial
denial to unit members of their right to participate in matters affecting
their employment violates section 8(b)(1)(A), then total denial of
participation by withholding of membership on invidious grounds must
certainly constitute the same violation.5 It seems that the Board has
achieved indirectly what it had since Independent Metal Workers Local
153 hesitated to do directly, that is bringing the unfair labor practices
remedial and enforcement machinery to bear on unions which purport
to represent those to whom they discriminatorially deny union member-
ship.54
47. 150 N.L.PB. at 315.
48. Id. at 323.
49. Cf. Macklin v. Spector Freight Systems, Inc., 478 F.2d 979 (1973) (affirmative
duty to avoid contract provisions which discriminate on the basis of sex).
50. 210 N.L.R.B. 943 (1974), enforced, 520 F.2d 693 (6th Cir. 1975).
51. Chairman Miller alone would "make clear that he viewe[d] the violation ...
as arising out of [the union's] failure fairly to represent the employees, in that separate
but allegedly equal representation is not fair representation. . . ." 210 N.L.R.B. at 944
n.5.
52. See Bekins Moving & Storage Co., 211 N.L.R.B. 138, 145 (1974) (Fanning &
Penello, dissenting).
53. 147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964). The Board had found there that exclusion from
membership on racial grounds constituted a breach of the duty of fair representation and
required decertification of the union, but it declined to find an unfair labor practice.
54. The traditional reluctance of the NLRB to inquire into the membership policies
1976]
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In evaluating the prospective effect of the Glass Bottle Blowers
decision on discriminatory union membership practices, the critical
question relates to the nature of evidence which the Board will deem
necessary to establish the existence of such practices. In the past it has
demanded evidence of actual union refusal of membership applications
from the employees allegedly aggrieved by the practice as the standard
for determining whether the Constitution will prohibit the Board from
aiding a discriminatory union by granting it exclusive representative
status.55 In that context, the Board's standard was repudiated by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in NLRB v.
Mansion House Center Management Corp."' In remanding the case to
the Board with directions to consider all relevant evidence, including
statistical data, the appellate court stated: "When evidence suggests
discrimination of racial imbalance the Board should inquire whether the
union has taken the initiative to affirmatively undo its discriminatory
practices. '57
The significance of this new standard will be considered more fully
in another section of this comment.5s Suffice it to say at this point that
it is obviously a great deal more liberal than its predecessor, at least as
to establishment of a prima facie case of discrimination in union mem-
bership. The NLRB could apply it by analogy to the proof required to
make out a section 8(b)(1)(A) -violation based on discriminatory
denial of membership, and indeed, it could be argued that only by
adopting such a standard will the Board be able to effectively attack
with unfair labor practice proceedings the residual effects of past union
discrimination."2
The importance of bringing breaches of the duty of fair representa-
tion within the unfair labor practices provision of the Act is best seen by
stems in large part from the proviso to section 8(b) (1) (A) of the Act which states:
"mhis paragraph shall not impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own
rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein .... " 29
U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1970).
The proviso has been interpreted to prohibit interference by the Board with union
membership criteria, but not the withholding of Board processes from those unions
which utilize unacceptable criteria. Hence, until Glass Bottle Blowers, the finding of
an unfair labor practice based on membership criteria was not allowed.
55. Mansion House Center Management Corp., 190 N.L.R.B. 437 (1971).
56. 473 F.2d 471 (8th Cir. 1971).
57. Id. at 477 (emphasis added).
58. See notes 78-95 infra and accompanying text.
59. Since the use of racial and other invidious criteria for determining union mem-
bership eligibility has been proscribed by civil rights statutes, the focus is now necessar-
fly on the "hangover" effects of former practices.
[Vol. 11: 513
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examining the consequences. The Miranda doctrine affords (1) a
direct remedy in that charges can be filed by anyone, (2) a specific
remedy, because the Board can order the union to cease and desist its
wrongful conduct and to take whatever affirmative steps are deemed
necessary to remove the effects of that conduct, and (3) judicial en-
forcement of both kinds of orders by court decree and, if necessary, by
contempt proceedings6 0
Despite its obvious potential for correcting unfairness, and particu-
larly invidious discrimination, on the part of unions, the Miranda doc-
trine has been cited as controlling the disposition of only three NLRB
cases in its thirteen years of existence. 61 Of course, it has played a
lesser part in numerous decisions, but the impression nevertheless is that
the doctrine has been underutilized.
This dearth of Miranda decisions has been blamed by one com-
mentator on the subtlety of the forms of union racism made possible,
particularly in the construction trades, by the unions' conditioning of
jobs and job training on discretionary criteria.2 In comparison with
the blatant discrimination found in the cases which developed the
Miranda doctrine, that practiced under the guise of discretionary
"screening" are extremely difficult to prove. The same is true of practi-
cally all forms of invidious discrimination which currently pervade
union operations. If the rationale of Miranda is accepted as valid, the
challenge becomes that of making it effective to achieve its purpose. A
possible solution is to expand the duty of fair representation which
underlies it.
One suggestion for accomplishing such an expansion is that the
NLRB place upon the union the burden of demonstrating both the
necessity and fairness of any conduct on its part which is shown to
restrain an individual's freedom to enter or practice any occupation
which the union controls. 3 To support such a presumption of illegali-
ty, attention must be given to the constitutional nature of the duty of fair
60. Another aspect of the Miranda case itself is worth noting. Under the older duty
of fair representation cases, Steele, Wallace, and Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive
Firemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944), that duty had been invoked to prevent discrimination
against nonunion unit members. Miranda established that the violation does not depend
on union membership or the lack of it. The basis on the unfair labor practice finding
was the breach of the duty of fair representation itself.
61. See General Truck Drivers Local 315, 217 N.L.R.B. No. 95 (1975); Nelson
Construction Co., 193 N.L.R.B. 724 (1971); Houston Maritime Ass'n, 168 N.L.R.B. 615
(1967).
62. Boyce, supra note 40, at 241.
63. Id. at 246-53.
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representation. The Steele opinion compared this duty with the duty of
a legislature to give equal protection to thosc whom it represents;
therefore, the Board would have support for applying to union conduct
the same presumption of unconstitutionality which federal courts cur-
rently apply to state conduct which interferes with the fundamental rights
of individuals.64
However, this proposition is vulnerable to attack in several re-
spects. For one thing, the Supreme Court has explicitly warned the
NLRB not to make the assumption that union conduct violates the
law.65 For another, it is far from settled that the duty of fair representa-
tion is rooted in the Constitution.66 The Court's Steele opinion was not
clear on the point, but it referred to the duty several times as a statutory
ono and implied that it was being imposed to avoid constitutional
problems. Moreover, the proposition of a constitutional base necessari-
ly carries with it the characterization of the union as a governmental
body. This concept is difficult to support under the more recent
"governmental action" cases.6 7
A broader approach which avoids these problems is that of apply-
ig to union decisions alleged to violate its duty of fair representation
64. "Because of the importance of the right involved and the suspect nature of the
state's classification, the usual presumption of constitutionality is reversed." Karst, In-
vidious Discrimination: Justice Douglas and the Return of the "Natural-Law-Due-
Process Formula," 16 U.C.L.A.L REv. 716, 719 (1969).
65. Teamsters Local 357 v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 (1961) (reversing a Board finding
that exclusive hiring halls per se violate the NLRA).
66. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
67. There are two possible approaches by which unions could be characterized as
governmental instrumentalities. The first emphasizes the status of exclusive bargaining
representative as a government granted monopoly. Since the authority of a certified
union is not merely tolerated, but is affirmatively directed by federal statute, and its ef-
fect is to make employees who voted against the union unwilling captives of its represen-
tative monopoly, then, it is said, the union acting is its statutory capacity must be subject
to the same restrictions as the government itself. Put another way, "when authority de-
rives in part from Government's thumb on the scales, the exercise of that power by pri-
vate persons becomes closely akin . . . to its exercise by Government itself." American
Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 401 (1950). The Court in that case
found no government action, however.
The second approach may be called the extensive regulation theory. It is based
on the idea that, in view of the public nature of union functions, their comprehensive
regulation and control by the government has so enmeshed government in union affairs
and conduct that union actions have become government actions. This was the argu-
ment advanced in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972). It was rejected
by the Court as applied to state regulation of the discriminating party where the state
regulation was not in direct support of the discrimination itself.
At least one circuit has stated in dictum that a union is not a governmental instru-
mentality. NLRB v. Mansion House Center Management Corp., 473 F.2d 471, 475 (8th
Cir. 1971).
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the standard of reasonableness." This appears to be an alternative
approved by the Board. In the recent case of General Truck Drivers
Local 31519 it was confronted with a union decision, made pursuant to a
poll of union members who could have been adversely affected, to refuse
to allow the employer to reassign with full senority an employee whose
job had been eliminated. The employment contract purported to guar-
antee the employee such reassignment. The Board70 relied on Miranda
for its finding of a section 8(b)(1)(A) violation, and discussed its
understanding of the duty of fair representation.
It is "more than an absence of bad faith or hostile motivation,"' at
least as to rights under an existing agreement,7 said members Kennedy
and Jenkins, but it is also the avoidance of arbitrary conduct-conduct
which is missing some ingredient required by the decision-making
process. The missing ingredient, a proper reason, causes the union's
decision to violate the duty of fair representation. If no reason is
apparent to support a union decision, the union is responsible for
showing a proper one.73
The majority found that the union had based its decision on a poll
which was inherently unfair to the complainant (1) by virtue of its
timing, after the job elimination had been announced, and (2) because
oniy union members who stood to lose from the union's assertion of the
contract right had participated.74 While it was conceded that the union
had the power under the contract and the NLRA to reach the result it
did, the duty of fair representation forbade reaching it by means of an
unfair procedure.
68. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
69. 217 N.L.R.B. No. 95 (1975).
70. The case was decided by a panel of three members, Jenkins, Kennedy, and
Penello.
71. 217 N.L.R.B. No. 95, at 6.
72. This limitation may be important as regards charges of invidious discrimination
because not all collective bargaining agreements contain antidiscrimination clauses; how-
ever, there is some evidence that such provisions are becoming more common. See
BAsic CoNTRACTS PATTRNs: AirmISCRIMINATION CLAUsES, LABOR RELATIONs YEAR-
Boor, 34 (1969) showing that even then 46 percent of the agreements in force contained
such clauses.
73. The Board appears to have, in effect, approved the reverse presumption of legal-
ity mentioned in the text accompanying note 65 supra, and its position is accordingly
weakened by the Supreme Court's caution in Teamsters Local 357 v. NLRB, 365 U.S.
667 (1961). Since the NLRB approach was not grounded in constitutional considera-
tions however, its opinion escapes a portion of the criticism directed to that proposal.
74. The Board refrained from discussing the effect of a union decision based on fair
polls of its membership, but its language implies that such would be acceptable conduct.
Cf. Guerra v. Manchester Terminal Corp., 350 F. Supp. 529 (S.D. Tex. 1972).
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The "standard of rationality" set out in the majority opinion 7  has
several advantages. It is applicable to union decisions based on insuffi-
cient or no reasons (arbitrary decisions) and to those made for im-
proper reasons (discriminatory decisions). Moreover, although the
Board's approach shows the influence of both equal protection and due
process considerations, those doctrines are applied by analogy, not by
incorporating the duty of fair representation into the Constitution. The
ptandard is grounded in the Act as interpreted by the NLRB and thus the
problems inherent in constitutionalizing the duty are avoided.
There is no indication whether the "standard of rationality" will be
adopted by a majority of the entire Board and thus be assured of some
influence on future cases.76 Of the alternative means of broadening the
duty of fair representation, this one appears to offer the most promise
and the fewest theoretical weaknesses. The NLRB would be well
advised to take advantage of it.77
It should be noted that broadening of the duty of fair representa-
tion as a solution to the underutilization of the Miranda doctrine has no
special significance to the victim of union discrimination on invidious
grounds. The change from a "bad faith" standard to a "rationality"
standard does not address his problem, because invidious discrimination,
when proved, was outlawed under the old standard. To make the
Miranda doctrine effective to prevent discrimination, the solution must
be directed to the problems of proof.
B. AGAINST EMPLOYERS
Under the Act, an employer has no obligation toward his employ-
ees comparable to the union's duty 'of fair representation because that
duty arises out of the representation of the employee by the union.78
75. Member Penello found no breach of the duty of fair representation. In the ab-
sence of hostility or bad faith he would view the decision as one within union discretion.
217 N.L.R.B. No. 95, at 15 (Penello, dissenting).
76. The trend in the federal courts toward broadening the standard could be a factor
favoring adoption.
77. In the interest of completeness, it should be mentioned that the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has just handed down a decision which suggests
another appealing alternative. In Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 90 L.R.R.M. 2497
(1975), that court held that negligence on the part of a union in grievance processing
may be a breach of the duty of fair representation. The impact of the idea was consid-
erably weakened by the court's characterization of the particular conduct involved as
also arbitrary and intentional. Contra, Brough v. United Steelworkers of America, 437
F.2d 748 (1st Cir. 1970); Bazarte v. United Transport Union, 429 F.2d 868 (3d Cir.
1970); Operating Engineers Local 18, 144 N.L.R.B. 1365 (1963).
78. NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co., 326 F.2d 172, 185 (2d Cir. 1963).
[Vol. 11:513
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Accordingly, an employer acting alone has traditionally been considered
outside the reach of unfair labor practices provisions. 79 A challenge to
this view was offered by the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia in United Packinghouse Workers v. NLRB. 80
Judge Skelly Wright's opinion found that unjustified discrimination on
the part of an employer was per se a restraint on the exercise of
employees' section 7 rights and thus a violation of section 8(a)(1). The
restraining effect was characterized as twofold:
(1) racial discrimination sets up an unjustified clash of in-
terests between groups of workers which tends to reduce the
likelihood and the effectiveness of their working in concert to
achieve their legitimate goals under the Act; and (2) racial
discrimination creates in its victims an apathy or docility
which inhibits them from asserting their rights against the
perpetrator of the discrimination."'
The court concluded that the confluence of the two factors was a
sufficient interference with the employees' rights to constitute the viola-
tion, and it remanded to the Board for hearings on the issue of whether
the company in fact had a "policy and practice" of racial discrimina-
tion."2
On remand, the NLRB refrained from comment on the new theory
and found that no discriminatory practice existed. However, four years
later in a case involving sex discrimination it specifically rejected the
court of appeals' per se approach. In Jubilee Manufacturing Co.s it
found that employer discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion,
sex or national origin, standing alone, was neither inherently destructive
of section 7 rights within the meaning of section 8(a)(1) nor discour-
agement of union membership in violation of section 8(a)(3). The
79. In contrast, employer discrimination in concert with a union is a violation by
him of sections 8(a) (1) & (3) of the Act. Similarly, his delegation to the union of
an employer function such as hiring gives rise to derivative liability in him if the union
discriminates in its performance of that function. Morris-Knudsen Co. v. NLRB, 275
F.2d 914 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 909 (1962). The Board has further
regulated employers' discriminatory conduct in the context of inflammatory appeals to
racial prejudice during organizational campaigns. See, e.g., Sewell Mfg. Co., 138
N.L.R.B.. 66 (1962).
80. 416 F.2d 1126 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 903 (1969).
81. Id. at 1135.
82. Following the Board's acceptance of the remand, the Supreme Court denied
certiorari, Farmers' Cooperative Compress v. United Packinghouse Workers, 396 U.S.
903 (1969). This action was interpreted by some as the Court's "stamp of approval."
Kohlmeier, NLRB's Role in Job Bias Disputes Is Enhanced by the Supreme Court, The
Wall Street Journal (Western ed.) Nov. 11, 1969, at 3, col. 1.
83. 202 N.L.R.B. 272 (1973).
1976]
15
Adamson: Invidious Discrimination under the National Labor Relations Act:
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1975
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
majority would require actual proof not only of unjustified discrimina-
tion but of the causal relationship between employer conduct and the
interference with exercise of employee rights.
At first blush the Board's requirement seems reasonable. The
agency has a legitimate interest in confining the extension of its remedies
to situations covered by the language of the Act, and it has shown a trend
away from per se rules in favor of a more flexible "totality of circum-
stances" approach. s4 However, Member Jenkins made a telling point in
Farmers' Cooperative Compress"5 when he equated the majority's ac-
ceptance of the employer's defense that the results of its practices were
the consequence of application of lawful criteria rather than discrimina-
tory intent with holding "that unlawful discrimination can be proved
only if a hostile intent or purpose to discriminate is shown.""6  He
pointed out that the Board had previously found inquiry into subjective
intent unrewarding and unreliable in other areas of the statute.
By focusing on proof of intent rather than the effects of the
challenged practices the Board has made the burden of the complainant
doubly difficult. Whereas emphasis on the effects of the practice would
make provable the more sophisticated forms of discrimination and
would tend to bring out evidence of a nexus between the practice and
the restraint on employees, emphasis on intent has just the opposite
result. If there is any doubt that the Board's requirement is so onerous
as to effectively eliminate unfair labor practices proceedings as a means
of discouraging individious discrimination by employers, one need only
consider that since the ruling in Jubilee not a single charge of a section
8(a)(1) violation based on such discrimination has been prosecuted
before the NLRB.
Substantive criticism of the Packinghouse doctrine has centered
around Judge Wright's theory that discriminatory practices breed "docil-
ity." In a period marked by racial hostility the idea was easily labeled
"an anachronism,"8 7 and the Jubilee majority pointed out that docility
was only one of several possible effects. Whether or not this prong of
84. See, e.g., Blue Flash Express, Inc., 109 N.L.R.B. 591, 594 (1954). Cf. NLRB
v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952).
85. 194 N.L.R.B. 85 (1971).
86. Id. at 91 (Jenkins, dissenting).
87. Racial Equality, supra note 5, at 238. However, the same criticism does not
necessarily lend itself to discrimination based on religion, sex, or national origin. See
Comment, Labor Law-Sex Discrimination-Employer Sex Discrimination and the
Labor Management Relations Act, 5 RuToERs-CAmmEN L.J 585, 597 (1973).
[Vol. 11:513
16
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 11 [1975], Iss. 4, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol11/iss4/3
INVIDIOUS DISCRIMINATION
the argument has merit, the focus on it has served to divert attention
from the stronger of the two effects theorized in Packinghouse.
There is undeniable realism in the second proposition, that employ-
er discrimination causes an "unjustified clash of interests"'88 between
victims of discrimination and other employees who presumably benefit,
or believe that they benefit from the practice. When the majority
perceives its interest to lie in perpetuation of such practices, concerted
action by members of both groups is hampered as energy and resources
which might have been expended to further the common advantage
must be diverted to reconciling these conflicting interests for purposes of
collective bargaining, grievance processing and other basic union func-
tions.
The Jubilee opinion's assertion that the "clash" was no more likely
than that discriminatory treatment would "cause minority groups to
coalesce, and it is possible that this could lead to collective action with
nonminority group union members[,]"8 9 is, by contrast, sheer supposition
lacking even the support of common sense. An example may serve to
highlight the inconsistency of that proposition with fundamental labor
law principles.
The principle of exclusive representation was formulated for the
purpose of avoiding the dissention and disruption of disorderly collective
bargaining, which it was believed would occur if the employer was
permitted to bargain with more than one representative from a unit, and
thus to arrive at multiple agreements resulting in disparate treatment of
groups within the unitY0 If so fundamental a principle was created to
avoid the disruptive effect of disparate treatment by an employer on
other than invidious grounds, can it possibly be believed that the fact of
invidiousness will serve to nullify the expected disruption? In all likeli-
hood, quite the contrary is true.
The lack of following achieved by the Packinghouse doctrine is
little short of remarkable if any credit is given to the arguments just
made.91  Several possible explanations suggest themselves. For one
thing, discrimination became increasingly subtle as employers who
sought to resist the spirit of the Civil Rights Act of 196492 discarded
88. United Packinghouse Workers v. NLRB, 416 F.2d 1126, 1135 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 903 (1969).
89. 202 N.L.R.B. at 272-73 (emphasis added).
90. J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 338-39 (1944).
91. Only one court has approved it. See Tipler v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co.,
443 F.2d 125 (6th Cir. 1971).
92. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241.
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obvious forms in favor of those more difficult to detect and prove.0 3
Even under the Packinghouse per se rule, de facto discrimination had to
be proved by evidence which met the Board's onerous requirements, 4
and thus courts were given little opportunity to consider the doctrine.
Another factor may well have been the mood of anticipation which
prevailed as Congress debated extensions in coverage and enforcement
powers of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). It
'was widely expected that the Commission would be given cease and de-
sist powers and would be enabled thereby to more effectively attack dis-
crimination by employers as well as others. Although the expectations
were not borne out,95 the atmosphere was not one in which courts could
be expected to undertake expansions of the Board's jurisdiction.
A third explanation may be simply judicial distaste for per se rules.
In consideration of the very real possibility that a rigid rule is inadequate
to the myriad variations possible in the section 8(a) (1) case, it is
suggested that many of the benefits of such a rule could be attained
while still affording employers protection against unrealistic findings of
unfair labor practices, the fear of which constitutes the major objection
to a per se rule. The key is to concentrate not on the theoretical
structure of the unfair labor practices concept, but on the problems of
proof which present the real obstacle to effective use of that concept to
discourage invidious discrimination by employers.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTIONS ON BOARD ACTION
One of the most significant developments in the handling of invidi-
ous discrimination under the NLRA has been the recent revitalization of
the theory that the NLRB is prohibited by the fifth amendment from
aiding a union which practices such discrimination."' The new life
came out of the opinion of the Eighth Circuit in Mansion House Center
93. Boyce, supra note 40, at 242.
94. See note 86 supra and accompanying text.
95. The EEOC was instead given only the authority to instigate court action
through a legislative compromise. (Previously it had been necessary for the Commission
to recommend prosecution to the Justice Department.) As to increased effectiveness,
according to the American Bar Association (ABA) Labor Relations Law Section, 1974
Committee Report 45, the Commission in 1974 had a backlog of 85,000 cases and ex-
pected its case intake for the next fiscal year to exceed 100,000. These figures neces-
sarily indicate delays.
96. The Board first utilized this constitutional limitation theory in the Independent
Metal Workers case. Following Mansion House, a three member majority of the present
Board has embraced it with renewed vigor. For the most thorough recent discussion
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Management Corp. v. NLRB9 7 wherein that court refused enforcement
of a Board decree which ordered the employer to bargain with a union
alleged to practice racial discrimination in membership.
In Mansion House the union confronted the employer with authori-
zation cards signed by seven of eight painters in his employ. The
employer refused to recognize the union as collective bargaining repre-
sentative, and subsequently discharged the employees, according to the
Trial Examiner, because of their union activity. The union charged
violations of sections 8(a)(5), 98 (1) and (2). At the unfair labor
practices hearing the employer defended the refusal to bargain charge
with the assertion that he had no duty to bargain with that union
because it had racially discriminatory membership policies and was
therefore not qualified to act as a bargaining representative. He offered
to show that in the operating area of the union, the population was more
than fifty percent nonwhite while the minority membership in the union
comprised less than two percent.
That evidence was excluded by the Trial Examiner who would
have required a showing that black employees had actually applied for
and been refused membership by the union. The Board agreed, found
that a section 8(a) (5) violation had occurred, and issued the order to
bargain.
In its denial of enforcement the court of appeals held:"9 (1) The
fifth amendment forbids access to NLRA remedial machinery to a union
which is unwilling to correct past practices of racial discrimination in
membership. (2) Where an employer defended his refusal to bargain
on the ground of racial discrimination, it was error to test the charges on
the sole question of whether any nonwhites had been refused union
membership. (3) Where the offered evidence shows significant minori-
ty underrepresentation in union membership the Board must inquire
whether the union has "taken the initiative to affirmatively undo its
discriminatory practices."' 00 Because of the important implications,
97. 473 F.2d 471 (SthCir. 1971).
98. Section 8(a) (5) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to
bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5)
(1970).
99. Before rendering its opinion the court asked for supplemental briefing by the
Board on several of the issues involved. For a summary of the response see Meltzer,
The National Labor Relations Act and Racial Discrimination: The More Remedies the
Better?, 42 U. Cm. L. Ruv. 1, 7 n.33 & 34 (1974).
100. 473 F.2d at 477. This portion of the holding has been characterized as impos-
ing on the Board a duty of independent investigation. Leslie, Governmental Action and
Standing: N.L.R.B. Certification of Discriminatory Unions, 1974 AIZ. ST. L.J. 35, 65
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each holding will be examined in detail.' 0'
The determination that the fifth amendment prohibits utilization of
NLRA processes by a discriminatory union 102 necessarily rests on two
propositions. First, action by the NLRB is governmental action. It is
not seriously questioned that conduct by a federal agency in the per-
formance of its statutory functions is governmental action for purposes
of applying constitutional limitations. 10 3 Second, by recognizing a dis-
criminatory union as collective bargaining representative the Board has
denied equal protection to minority group unit members within the
meaning of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. 0 4 It is far from clear
that this is true.
The Board's recognition amounts to a congressionally authorized
grant of exclusive power to the union to act as the bargaining represent-
ative for all members of the unit. As far as the NLRA is concerned,
that action by the Board is commanded in recognition of the fact that by
election or otherwise a majority of the employees in the unit have
expressed the desire to be represented by that union. The question is,
does that action "foster or encourage racial discrimination"'05° where it
has the effect of forcing minority employees to accept representation by
an organization which formerly denied membership to persons of their
group? 06 To say that it does is to ignore the distinction so often
stressed by the courts between governmental involvement with the dis-
[hereinafter cited as Leslie]. In practice, however, it will entail only an obligation to
consider exculpatory evidence provided by the union.
101. For a detailed discussion of the effect of the jus tertii doctrine on the implied
holding that an employer has standing to assert the rights of his employees see Leslie,
supra note 100, at 38-46. While the Act allows anyone to assert employees' rights with
regard to unfair labor practices charges, it is silent on that count as to proceedings in
which union disqualification is sought.
102. While the same rationale could theoretically be applied to impose penalties
against employers who bargain with discriminatory unions, it seems unlikely the Board
will do so. But see Laborers' Local 478, 204 N.L.R.B. 357 (1973) (Jenkins, dissenting).
103. "Although the union itself is not a government instrumentality, the National La-
bor Relations Board is." 473 F.2d at 475.
104. The Mansion House court explained that the Board would significantly become
"a willing participant in the union's discriminatory practices." 473 F.2d at 475. How-
ever, it failed to articulate the reasoning by which it found the necessary nexus between
the Board's action and the unequal protection. Whatever its reasons for that conclusion,
the court seemed to draw added support for it from the fact that the Board was seeking
judicial enforcement of its order. It found such enforcement forbidden by the line of
cases exemplified by Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334
U.S. 1 (1948); and Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1947). Of course such reliance is
unwarranted if the action of the Board was not a violation of equal protection.
105. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 176-77 (1972).
106. This approach should be distinguished from that which focuses on the union's
action as governmental action. See note 67 supra.
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criminatory practice and governmental involvement with the discrimi-
nating party.ror
A good illustration of that distinction is afforded by the case of
Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvise°s in which the asserted governmental
involvement was extensive state regulation of a private organization
through a liquor control board. The trial court had found that the
cumulative effect of that regulation constituted sufficient state involve-
ment in the lodge's discriminatory practices to activate the fourteenth
amendment's limitations. This reasoning was rejected by the Supreme
Court which found that only one state regulation was prohibited, and
that was one which required licensees to abide by their constitutions and
bylaws. The effect of that requirement was to enforce the discrimina-
tion itself where the organization's constitution contained racially dis-
criminatory provisions. The other regulations which the lodge had to
follow to retain its liquor license did not specifically relate to the
discrimination and thus, while they evidenced state support for the
lodge, they did not support discrimination in such a way as to call forth
the equal protection doctrine. 09
By the same token, the NLRB's involvement is with the union and
not with its practice of invidious discrimination, and further, the Board's
act of recognition serves to subject the union to the duty of fairness to all
those whom it represents. Thus, far from encouraging discrimination,
it can be argued that the Board's action serves to discourage it by
subjecting the perpetrator to unfair labor practices peoceedings.110 It
follows that if the Board's action does not violate the fifth and four-
teenth amendments, judicial enforcement of that action is not forbidden.
That there is arguably no constitutional requirement that the
NLRB withhold its processes from those who practice invidious discrim-
ination is not to say that the Board may not withhold them. There is
some support for the idea that the NLRA could and should be interpret-
ed to allow this under the Board's implied discretionary authority over
107. See, e.g., Driscoll v. Operating Engineers Local 139, 484 F.2d 682 (7th Cir.
1973); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 483 F.2d 754 (3d Cir. 1973); Powe v. Miles,
407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968).
108. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
109. See also Burton v. Wilmington Park Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961),
wherein the Court found that "[tihe state has so far insinuated itself into a position of
interdependence with [the discriminating party] that it must be recognized as a joint
participant in the challenged activity .... (Emphasis added.)
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representation matters."- Under this theory the Board would decide in
each case whether its interference with union membership policies or its
denial of process was necessary to effectuate the purposes of the NLRA,
utilizing its expertise in making that finding and taking into account the
countervailing legislative intent evidenced by the Taft-Hartley addition
to section 8(b)(1)(A) of a proviso which specifically protects the right
of a union to make its own rules respecting membership.112
This approach offers the advantage of flexibility, and it confines
the problem to statutory dimensions thereby giving effect to the long-
standing judicial doctrine of avoiding constitutional solutions where
there are plausible alternatives. It would allow the Board to resort to
denial of certification only in extreme cases so that the possibility of
leaving employees without a bargaining representative to deal with
an employer who may also discriminate would be minimized.
The second Mansion House holding, that union membership dis-
crimination must be measured by indirect statistical evidence as well as
by actual proof of discriminatory acts, may turn out to be the significant
one. It was reached by the court after it considered the impact of Title
VII cases holding that "'as a matter of law that these statistics, which
revealed an extraordinarily small number of black employees. . . estab-
lished a violation of Title VII . . . "113 and that by demonstration of a
substantial disparity between the percentage of Negro residents in the
county and of Negroes included "'tihe appellants thereby made out a
prima facie case of . . . discrimination, and the burden fell on the
appellees to overcome it.' """ The court concluded that the same
standard of proof was applicable to discrimination under the NLRA and
that statistical evidence could provide sufficient proof to establish a
prima facie case of past racial practices. It follows that if the union can
not meet its burden of refuting the evidence or showing affirmative ef-
forts to rectify the situation, that evidence establishes the violation and
the Board is bound to refuse to recognize the union as collective bargain-
ing agent.
In essence, the court of appeals switched the emphasis of inquiry
from the intent underlying the discriminatory policy to the effect of that
111. Meltzer, The National Labor Relations Act and Racial Discrimination: The
More Remedies the Better?, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 11-12 (1974).
112. See note 54 supra.
113. 473 F.2d at 476, quoting from Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d
421 (Sth Cir. 1970).
114. 473 F.2d at 476, quoting from Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970).
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policy. It raised the standard of acceptable union conduct stating:
"'[G]ood intent or the absence of discriminatory intent does not re-
deem employment procedures . .. that operate as "built-in head-
winds" for minority groups ... ."115 The implication is that evi-
dence which would establish discrimination for Title VII purposes will
establish discrimination for purposes of requiring the NLRB to deny its
aid.
Although the Board was not bound to follow the Mansion House
approach," 6 it has applied the constitutional limitation doctrine and has
accepted, with some modification, the evidentiary standard as well. In
Bekins Moving & Storage Co.," 7 an employer filed objections to the
union petition for a Board election on the ground that the union
practiced invidious discrimination in membership and was therefore not
qualified to act as exclusive bargaining agent. The Board explicitly
approved the constitutional limitation doctrine, but determined that in
the interest of avoiding delay it would not entertain a charge of union
discrimination for the purpose of postponing or defeating an election.
The proper time for such an allegation, it said, was after the union had
won, in a challenge to its certification." 8
This limitation of the Mansion House doctrine eliminates one of its
major drawbacks. If the Board had allowed employers to delay elec-
tions by the mere allegation of discrimination, the momentum of union
organizational efforts would often be dissipated by that delay alone.
Such an attractive possibility could be expected to encourage frivolous
charges and to significantly increase the workload of the NLRB.
The Bekins majority, by resting its disposition of the case on
constitutional considerations, bypassed the opportunity to clarify the
evidentiary guidelines set out in Mansion House. The Board did state,
however, that it would determine on a case-by-case basis whether the
nature and quantum of proof offered would mandate withholding certi-
fication. It indicated that it had no intention of regarding
every possible alleged violation of Title VII, for example, as
grounds for refusing to issue a certificate. There will doubt-
115. 473 F.2d at 477, quoting from Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432
(1971).
116. It could, for example, have sought contrary rulings in other circuits and paved
the way for Supreme Court review on the ground of conflict among the circuits.
117. 211 N.L.R.B. 138 (1974).
118. While the dissenting opinion found no constitutional requirement that certifica-
tion be withheld, it pointed out that if the majority was correct, a precertification chal-
lenge ought to be allowed because the employees' knowledge that the union might later
be disqualified could well affect the outcome of the election.
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less be cases in which we will conclude that correction of such
statutory violations is best left to the expertise of other agen-
cies or to remedial orders less draconian than the total with-
holding of representative status.110
In the 2% years since Mansion House was decided, the case-by-
case approach has made little headway toward establishing generally
applicable guidelines to the evidence problem. The rulings have uni-
formly been directed to evidence which will not establish a prima facie
case of discrimination, 2" and because such a case has not yet been held
established, the showing required to overcome one has not received any
discussion.
Despite the frustrating lack of evidentiary guidance, the NLRB has
begun to establish policies which set the boundaries of the Mansion
House defense. It found that a showing of membership discrimination
on noninvidious grounds does not qualify to invoke the Mansion House
doctrine.' 2 ' The defense does not apply where the charging party is the
union local but it is the individual members who stand to benefit from
Board processes.' 22 It does not encompass allegations of sex discrimi-
119. 211 N.L.R.B. at 139-40.
120. Hawkins Constr. Co., 210 N.L.R.B. 965 (1974) (a showing of 2.4 percent
minority union membership in a population with 3.3 percent was insufficient); Grant's
Furniture Plaza, 213 N.LR.B. No. 80 (1974) (statistical showing of minority underrep-
resentation in union does not make out a prima facie case without evidence of union
control of entry into the job field); id. (a Justice Department complaint alleging discrim-
ination is not proper evidence because not a proven charge).
The last ruling hints at 'the related problem of what effect to give to a decision find-
ing discrimination based on such a complaint. In this connection, it is worthwhile to
consider the Supreme Court's opinion in Alexander v. Gardener-Denver, 415 U.S. 36(1973), wherein the Court concluded that an arbitration decision adverse to the em-
ployee claim of discrimination was not conclusive of the issue in a subsequent Title VII
charge based on the same evidence. See also Tipler v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co.,
443 F.2d 125 (6th Cir. 1971).
The problems of relating and coordinating proceedings under the NLRA, Title VII,
and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (now considered applicable to racial
discrimination under employment contracts, cf. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S.
409 (1968)) have been of increasing concern to courts and commentators. See, e.g.,
Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); Macklin v. Spector Freight, 478 F.2d 979 (D.C.
Cir. 1973); Guerra v. Manchester Terminal Corp., 350 F. Supp. 529 (S.D. Tex. 1972);
L.R. Wilson, 204 N.L.R.B. 357 (1973); Beaird, Racial Discrimination in Employ-
ment: Rights and Remedies, 6 GA. L. REv. 469 (1972); Blumrosen, The Newport News
Agreement: One Brief Shining Moment in the Enforcement of Equal Employment Op-
portunity, 1968 U. ILL. L.F. 269; Kilberg, Progress and Problems in Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity, 24 LAB. L.J. 651 (1973); Meltzer, The National Labor Relations Act
and Racial Discrimination: The More Remedies the Better?, 42 U. CHi. L. REv. 1(1974); Note, Allocating Jurisdiction over Racial Issues Between the EEOC and NLRB:
A Proposal, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 943 (1969).
121. Community Service Publishing, Inc., 216 N.L.R.B. No. 180 (1975).
122. General Cinema Corp., 214 N.L.R.B. No. 147 (1974).
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nation. 123 An employer who objected unsuccessfully to certification of
the union on grounds of discrimination cannot reassert those grounds in
defense of a subsequent unfair labor practices charge. 124  Finally, the
Board declined to rule that the fact that the employer's commission of
unfair labor practices was unrelated to union discrimination precludes
his use of the defense. 125
Considering the frequency with which the Board has been con-
fronted with the Mansion House defense, it is striking that thus far there
has not been a single instance in which that defense prevailed. The
cases seem to indicate that the NLRB is far more concerned with
limiting the doctrine than with preventing membership discrimination
by unions. There are several possible explanations for this attitude.
For one thing, the total denial of representative status is a serious
matter, and one which the Board has often indicated it would not
undertake lightly.12 6 Only once has certification been denied for rea-
sons of union discrimination. 2 ' Thus, the current Board attitude is
really the continuation of a long-established policy.
Another consideration is the requirement under Mansion House
that the employer's refusal to bargain must be caused by the union's
discriminatory practices. 128  In the cases brought thus far, there has
been no attempt by the employers to show this cause and effect
relationship. Although the Board disposed of these cases on other
grounds, a part of its willingness to do so might well be the lack of such
a showing.
Aside from the reasons behind the reluctance of the NLRB to
apply the Mansion House doctrine, there are basic weaknesses in the
doctrine which militate against its use. The questionableness of the
constitutional limitation theory has been discussed previously 29 and
123. Bell & Howell Co., 213 N.L.R.B. No. 79 (1974). This determination was the
result of Member Kennedy's conviction that only classification declared "suspect" by
the Supreme Court should be considered as requiring the withholding of certification.
The other members split two and two as they had in Bekins.
124. Preform Co., 215 N.L.R.B. No. 9 (1974).
125. Williams Enterprises, 212 N.L.R.B. No. 132 (1974). The case was decided on
other grounds, but that ruling would appear to be required by Mansion House, 473 F.2d
at 474.
126. See, e.g., Pioneer Busing Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 54 (1962); Hughes Tool Co., 104
N.L.R.B. 318 (1953); Larus & Bros. Co., 62 N.L.R.B. 1075 (1945).
127. Independent Metal Workers Local 1, 147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964). The case was
also the first in which the Board found itself constitutionally required to make the de-
nial.
128. See note 124 supra and accompanying text.
129. See note 14 supra and accompanying text; text accompanying note 66 supra.
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presents the strongest theoretical argument for discarding the doctrine.
Additionally, there exist several policy considerations. In order to ef-
fectuate the doctrine, the Board is required to refuse to carry out its
statutory function of encouraging orderly collective bargaining. It thus
undercuts fundamental labor policy and is placed in the position of
being at odds with its own purpose.
When the Mansion House doctrine is applied to deny certification
to a discriminatory union, the effect is to refuse to employees their
section 7 right to be represented by their chosen bargaining agent.13 0
Moreover, the doctrine takes away from minority employees the decision
as to whether they would prefer representation by a union which dis-
criminates to no representation at all. It is quite possible that they
would conclude that their rights would be better protected by any union
than by their employer, who may himself practice invidious discrimina-
tion.
The doctrine provides employers with an incentive by allowing
them to raise the issue of union discrimination and thereby delay or
avoid establishment of a collective bargaining relationship. But it is not
every employer who is possessed of a social conscience which demands
that he expend time and money in an effort to override for their own
good a decision his employees have made. Perhaps it is not unrealistic
to say that the real appeal of the doctrine is not to that employer, but to
the one who simply does not want the union.
This possibility could be tolerated if the Mansion House doctrine
was effective in preventing invidious discrimination by unions, but such
is not the case. It has not only failed to attain that objective in practice,
but is impotent to reach strong unions who are able to establish collec-
tive bargaining relationships without resorting to help from the Board.
In fact, the threat of disqualification may serve to discourage use of the
certification process by those unions which are powerful enough to do
without it, but which might otherwise utilize it for convenience or
insurance.
For all these reasons the Mansion House doctrine is unsound. It
should accordingly be discarded in favor of the solution implied in the
Glass Bottle Blowers case131 under which a union which discriminates in
membership would be certified and subject itself to the likelihood of an
unfair labor practices charge by the employer or unit members if it did
130. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
131. See notes 52-61 supra and accompanying text.
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not remedy the effects of its unlawful policies. This approach would
avoid all of the major objections to the Mansion House doctrine and
would offer the advantages of section 8 remedies which were discussed
in connection with the Miranda doctrine. 132
V. A SUGGESTED SOLUTION
The theories under which the NLRB inhibits invidious discrimina-
tion have one problem in common. Each has been rendered less
effective because of unrealistic standards of proof. It is time that the
NLRB face the fact that overtly discriminatory conduct is largely a
phenomenon of the past, that the residual discrimination is no less real
or damaging, but far more difficult to demonstrate. For this reason
attempts to reach discriminatory behavior through expansions in the
scope of existing theories will be largely ineffective, as the Eighth
Circuit recognized in Mansion House, unless they concurrently address
the issue of the nature and quantum of proof which the Board should
require to establish that invidious discrimination exists.
An attractive solution to the evidentiary dilemma already exists in
the scheme proposed by the Mansion House opinion. Its concentration
on the discriminatory effects of the questioned practice places the em-
phasis where it belongs-on the fact that the result of the practice is an
improper one. Although that scheme has thus far been applied by the
Board only to permit employers to justify their own antiunion behavior,
it seems that it could be applied as well in any context in which
discriminatory conduct allegedly violates the Act. This would mean
that statistical evidence showing any sort of union discrimination regard-
ing membership criteria, hiring hall referrals or grievance processing
could, if persuasive, call forth from that union the requirement that it
justify its conduct.
The same requirement would have to be met by employers, but
through a different process, since it must be established not only that
they discriminate but also that their discrimination interferes with em-
ployees' exercise of their rights to establish or to refrain from establish-
ing a collective bargaining relationship. In this situation, the standard
of proof would have to apply to both stages. This approach would
avoid the rigidity of the Packinghouse doctrine and would considerably
lighten the burden for the complaining party.
132. See text accompanying note 60 supra.
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It may be argued that this proposal would require the Board, and
particularly its administrative law judges, to engage in lengthy hearings
in an area where they have little experience. As to experience, what the
Board has not learned from its consideration of the cases which have
asserted the Mansion House defense, it could with little effort garner
from judicial application of the similar Title VII standard. There is no
doubt that more time will be consumed in considering evidence under a
more liberal standard. Yet it is important to remember that delay is an
inevitable result where the issue itself has become more complex. The
increased time is mandated not so much by application of a new
standard as by the demands of reality. The alternative is to ignore
reality and, for the sake of convenience, to set the Board's course in the
direction of obsolescence as far as its involvement with discrimination in
labor relations is concerned.
If the NLRB should see fit to adopt a more realistic approach to
evidence of discrimination, it should also accept the responsibility of
setting out some guidelines as to how it will be applied. It has already
been noted that its reluctance to apply the constitutional limitation
doctrine has resulted in its failure to establish evidentiary guidelines in
cases under that doctrine. While it is possible that a case-by-case
approach would prove adequate, implementation of the new standard
would be greatly facilitated by the Board's utilizaiton of its rule-making
power to establish general limits to the standard. Carefully formulated
guidelines would not only be of great help to the General Counsel and to
potential complainants, but could also go a long way toward keeping
increasing demands on Board resources within manageable proportions.
VI. CONCLUSION
The present ineffectiveness of the NLRB in solving problems of
invidious discrimination is due in part to the Board's vacillation between
its duty to comply with the national labor policy against discrimination
and its desire to limit its jurisdiction in order to (1) restrict its decisions
to situations traditionally covered by the Act, and (2) to avoid imping-
ing on territory relegated by Congress to other enforcement agencies. 188
While it is obviously important to reconcile these conflicting considera-
tions, such a result cannot be achieved by hesitation.
The NLRB occupies a unique position in that it affords the only
133. But Title VII was not intended to limit or exclude remedies for discrimination
under the NLRA. 110 CoNG. Rc. 13650-52, 13653 (1964).
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extrajudicial forum with jurisdiction over labor discrimination which
also has experience in dealing with a broad range of employment
controversies and which possesses the statutory authority to issue both
cease and desist orders and a variety of specific remedial orders limited
only by imagination.134 For these reasons the Board presents an ideal
vehicle for the resolution of controversies involving invidious discrimina-
tion in the employment arena. It is unthinkable that it cannot and
should not recognize that the aforementioned considerations are not in
conflict. The elimination of tensions which arise from discrimination is
essential to the maintenance of industrial peace and orderly collective
bargaining which it is the very purpose of the NLRA to foster.
Of course it would be simplistic to claim that practical reconcilia-
tion of those duties is easy. But once a firm decision is made that it can
and must be done without substantial sacrifice of either, the way is
cleared toward formulation of a policy under which unduly mechanical
interpretation of the Act will not be allowed to interfere with its use in
discouraging invidious discrimination by those within its powers.
Implementing such a policy need not entail radical restructuring of
the methods now utilized by the Board. Indeed, adoption of the
Mansion House evidence standard of proof to employer and union
discrimination under the traditional duty of fair representation and
unfair labor practices theories would go a long way toward accomplish-
ing the desired ends, and the structure of those theories would remain
intact. Moreover, by taking the approach of strengthening those two
concepts the Board would increase the effectiveness of its processes to
deal with the reality of covert discrimination. If this were to occur,
there would be no need to retain the constitutional limitation doctrine
with its questionable rationale and drastic results. It could be allowed
to sink into well-deserved oblivion.
Marilyn 0. Adamson
134. By contrast, the EEOC is directed to engage in voluntary conciliation. It can-
not impose remedies nor issue cease and desist orders. This weakness in enforcement
powers has prompted one author to observe: "If [the Packinghouse] view prevails, con-
tinued existence for the EEOC, with no power to issue cease and desist orders, would
be difficult to justify." Sovern, An Overview of Equal Employment Opportunity, an un-
published paper presented at an ABA Section of Labor Relations seminar, quoted in B.
MELTZER, LABOR LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 911 (1970).
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